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RESTORING EFFECTIVE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: REFORM 
PROPOSALS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL 
SUBPOENAS 
 
Kia Rahnama† 
 
This Article proposes possible legislative reforms to Congress’s exercise of its 
contempt power in combating non-compliance with subpoenas duly issued as part of 
congressional investigations.  With the recent trends in leveraging congressional 
investigations as an effective tool of separation of powers, this Article seeks to 
explore the exact bounds of congressional power in responding to executive officers’ 
noncompliance with congressional subpoenas, and whether or not current practice 
could be expanded beyond what has historically been tried by the legislative branch.  
This Article provides a brief summary of the historic practice behind different options 
for responding to non-compliance with subpoenas (inherent contempt power, 
statutory criminal contempt, and civil enforcement of subpoenas), explores both 
political and legal incentives that create deficiencies for each option in the context 
of recent and current ongoing congressional investigations, and includes possible 
proposals for new avenues of redress for Congress.  This Article will also include 
discussion of controlling Supreme Court decisions that clarify the exact nature of 
Congress’s investigative power and whether these new reform proposals would be in 
line with past Supreme Court decisions.  It also specifically analyzes the option of 
legislative reform aimed at triggering salary diminution or imposing other fiscal 
pressures on agency officials as a tool for shaping political incentives that lead to 
better compliance with congressional subpoenas. 
 
“[A] popular Government, without popular information, 
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce 
or a Tragedy; or perhaps both … [P]eople who mean to be 
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power 
which knowledge gives.”  
—James Madison1 
                                                          
†  JD/MA, George Washington University Law School and the Elliott School of International Affairs.  I 
am grateful to Todd Garvey for enlightening conversations on issues of congressional oversight and to Judge 
Richard J. Leon for sharing his unrivaled historical knowledge and perspective on this area of law.  I would like 
to thank Mozhdeh Shahin, Ardeshir Rahnama, Arash Rahnama, and Natalie Tarasar for their never-ending sup-
port and encouragement.  Finally, I would like to thank the dedicated staff and editors of the Journal of Legis-
lation for editing this Article.  Any remaining errors are mine alone. 
1  Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 
(Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1910). 
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INTRODUCTION 
To ensure political accountability and transparency when public interest and 
demand for inquiry and information reaches its zenith, congressional oversight and 
investigation remains the uniquely timeless respite provided by the American 
constitutional system.  This perception is even more palpable today when, in the 
aftermath of a portentous presidential campaign, public pressure for congressional 
inquiry into many election-related controversies persists.2  It is not surprising that this 
renewed popular awareness about the importance of congressional inquiry coincides 
with a formative political event, such as a presidential campaign, as many such 
subject matters of high political interest do not lend themselves to resolution by the 
judicial branch through criminal investigation.3  They are instead more ripe for 
political resolution through avenues of congressional investigation.4  From precise 
and productive congressional investigations that led to the enactment of monumental 
reforms, such as the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the Clayton Antitrust Act, to 
more unpleasant ventures, such as the McCarthy investigations of the 1950s that have 
equally left their mark on American history, popular perception of the practice has 
varied greatly.5  Understandably, the powers and procedures of congressional 
investigations are always subject to new challenges and criticisms.  Today, these 
criticisms are often aimed at the increasing cost of high-profile investigations and the 
increasing tendency for partisan battles that reduce the public’s trust in the 
effectiveness of the process.6  Yet, as the pages of American history have turned, 
Congress has shown incredible malleability in adjusting its response to political 
obstructions that hinder its investigatory power and has preserved this grant of 
inherent power, with roots tracing back to the House of Commons’ practice in the 
sixteenth century.7  
                                                          
 2 Matt Fuller, Democrats Ask Oversight Committee to Investigate Trump’s Potential Conflicts of Interest, 
FORBES (Nov. 28, 2016) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/democrats-letter-chaffetz-trump-conflicts-of-in-
terest_us_583ca265e4b04b66c01b6c5a; Adam Schiff & Jane Harman, Russia Attacked Our Democracy. That 
Demands Intense Review by Congress, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin-
ions/russia-attacked-our-democracy-that-demands-intense-review-by-congress/2016/12/23/291be72c-c865-
11e6-8bee-54e800ef2a63_story.html?utm_term=.5840829676e0; Chas Danner, Trump Asks Congress to Inves-
tigate Obama Over Wiretap that White House Refuses to Provide Evidence For, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 5, 2017) 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/03/trump-asks-congress-to-investigate-wiretap-conspiracy-the-
ory.html.  
3  See infra note 5 and accompanying text. 
4  TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT 
POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 
3 (2012) (describing the role of congressional investigations in exposing corruption, inefficiency, or waste).  In 
fact, the Congress’s first attempt at asserting its contempt authority involved an investigation into accusations 
of bribery of its members, a matter more suited for resolution by the legislative body itself, as opposed to the 
courts.  Id. at 8–9.    
5  See Matthew Mantel, Congressional Investigations: A Bibliography, 100 L. LIBR. J. 323 (2008). 
6  Michelle Cottle, What Congress Is Actually Good At, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.theat-
lantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/what-congress-is-actually-good-at/500876/; Joshua Roberts, How Much 
Has Trump-Russia Investigation Cost? Kellyanne Conway Says ‘Millions’ of Dollars, NEWSWEEK (June 19, 
2017), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-russia-cost-627204. 
7  See C.S. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 780 (1926), 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8117&context=penn_law_review.  See also 
HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VII TO THE 
DEATH OF GEORGE II 195 (1875) (Hallam traces the first exercise of quasi-judicial contempt power by the 
House of Commons to the Ferrer’s case of 1543). 
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Today, Congress’s investigatory power faces a primary obstacle: the 
weakness of the congressional subpoena.  This has resulted in the diminishment of 
Congress’s contempt power—their main coercive tool to address refusals to 
comply—further weakening Congress’s ability to investigate.  This problem is 
heightened when the subject of the congressional subpoena is an executive branch 
official and the contempt power is exercised against an officer who is under the direct 
supervision of the President.  Practical limitations that prevent Congress from 
imposing penalties on executive officers who do not comply with congressional 
subpoenas naturally limit Congress’s access to critical information that is necessary 
for conducting investigations.  Without proper reordering of these incentives, these 
predictable political challenges to congressional investigations effectively delay and 
hinder inquiries.  Beyond the negative impact on the legislative process, this 
institutional dysfunction imposes a social cost that is visibly reflected in the 
increasing cost of congressional investigations.8   
The political challenges contributing to this problem are mainly rooted in 
how each branch perceives the exact nature of congressional investigations.  While 
the executive branch views the process of congressional oversight as one marked and 
defined by “negotiation and accommodation” between two co-equal branches, 
Congress perceives its investigatory power to be synonymous with the legal process 
carried out by courts of law, with “all indicia of court proceeding.”9  This theoretical 
disagreement colors the recent conflicts associated with the exact proper weight of 
congressional subpoenas and the options available to the legislative branch in 
punishing noncompliance with those subpoenas.  
This Article seeks to outline the nature of the political and constitutional 
limitations imposed on congressional committees in enforcing congressional 
subpoenas and its contempt power, considering this issue through the lens of one of 
the most recent oversight inquiries into the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) political-
targeting scandal.  This Article proposes a new solution to said institutional challenge 
by reexamining the boundaries of Congress’s constitutional power to impose 
monetary fines and penalties for contemptuous behavior by executive officers or 
introduce wage garnishment measures in response to nonpayment of fines.  This 
Article will analyze the history and tradition of Congress’s contempt power, address 
potential constitutional challenges, and propose ideas for venturing into this new 
practice. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE IRS INVESTIGATION 
In February of 2012, various media outlets began publishing stories that 
documented anecdotal evidence suggesting that a number of non-profit organizations 
were facing extra-ordinary scrutiny from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 
obtaining tax-exemption status under § 501(c)(4) of the Tax Code.10  These reports 
suggested that beginning in 2011, an increase in demand for tax-exemption status by 
non-profit organizations led to an issuance of IRS directives to its lower officials in 
                                                          
8  See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
9 CONSTITUTION PROJECT, Separation of Powers and Congressional Oversight, Part 1, C-SPAN, 
00:45:25, 00:46:10 (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?417428-1/discussion-focuses-separation-
powers-congressional-oversight&start=4560.  
10  Mike Opelka, Is Obama Using the IRS to Silence Opposition Voices?, THE BLAZE (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2012/02/14/is-obama-using-the-irs-to-silence-opposition-voices/.  
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local branches to further scrutinize qualification for tax-exempt status, incorporating 
politically charged key words such as “Tea Party” and “9/12 Project.”11  These 
guidelines were set out in “Be on the Lookout” (BOLO) documents sent to various 
IRS offices.  In June 2011, the then-acting Director of Exempt Organizations, Lois 
Lerner, a Senior Executive Service Employee, was advised of this practice, two years 
prior to the disclosure of this practice to the members of Congress.12  In March of 
2012, IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman testified before the House Ways & Means 
Subcommittee on Oversight that the IRS had not targeted any conservative 
organizations.13   
Pursuant to media reports, in February 2012, Representative Darrell Issa (R-
CA) and Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH), on behalf of the House Oversight 
Committee, asked the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) 
to conduct a review into the IRS allegedly applying erroneous scrutiny to certain 
applications based on political considerations.14  In May 2013, the TIGTA issued its 
report and concluded that the IRS had in fact used “inappropriate criteria” in 
determining tax-exempt status for certain political advocacy groups.15  The report, 
however, indicated that IRS officials continued to maintain that the keywords were 
used “as shorthand to efficiently manage a deluge of new political advocacy 
groups.”16  Subsequently, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the FBI 
would initiate an investigation to determine whether any criminal violations had 
taken place at the IRS.17  After pressure from the White House, the Acting 
Commissioner for the IRS, Steve Miller, resigned in the summer of 2013.18  While 
testifying before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in May 
of 2013, IRS official Lois Lerner pleaded the Fifth Amendment and refused to 
testify.19  Reports also indicated that Lerner refused to resign despite the IRS 
                                                          
11  Issa Talks IRS Targeting Investigation, Previews Thursday's IRS Conference Spending Hearing on 
CNN SOTU, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM (June 2, 2013), https://republicans-over-
sight.house.gov/release/issa-talks-irs-targeting-investigation-previews-thursdays-irs-conference-spending-
hearing-on-cnn-sotu/. 
12  Kelly Phillips Erb, Updated: Timeline of IRS Tax Exempt Organization Scandal, FORBES (Mar. 2, 
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2015/03/02/updated-timeline-of-irs-tax-exempt-organiza-
tion-scandal/#1975dea27b2b; FBI Investigation Documents of IRS Scandal, JUDICIAL WATCH (July 27, 2016), 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-fbi-investigation-documents-irs-scan-
dal/.  
13 Rachael Bade, Timeline of IRS Scandal, POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.Polit-
ico.com/story/2014/09/timeline-of-the-irs-scandal-111185. 
14  Investigation of the IRS, HOUSE REPUBLICANS https://www.gop.gov/solution_content/irs-investiga-
tion/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2019). 
15  TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NO. 2013-10-053, INAP-
PROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013), 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf. 
16  Juliet Eilperin & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Criminal Probe of IRS Launched as Report Details Targeting 
of Conservative Groups, WASH. POST (May 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/econ-
omy/holder-orders-fbi-justice-probe-of-irs/2013/05/14/7891fde6-bcc0-11e2-9b09-
1638acc3942e_story.html?utm_term=.9ed7b8e7feab; see TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN, supra 
note 15 at 7. 
17  Id. 
18  Bade, supra note, at 13.  
19  Ed O’Keefe & William Branigin, Lois Lerner Invokes Fifth Amendment in House Hearing on IRS 
Targeting, WASH. POST (May 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lois-lerner-invokes-fifth-
amendment-in-house-hearing-on-irs-targeting/2013/05/22/03539900-c2e6-11e2-8c3b-
0b5e9247e8ca_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.e70bd039314d.  
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Commissioner’s request, but was put on administrative leave and continued to 
receive federal pay and benefits.20  Political criticism of the IRS’s actions were 
further intensified in reaction to related news that the Agency had given its employees 
$70 million in bonuses in conflict with the Office of Management and Budget’s 
request to all agencies to halt these payments due to budgetary constraints.21  It was 
also reported that Lois Lerner had received sizable retention bonuses during her time 
at the IRS.22  Lois Lerner eventually resigned in September 2013.23  
In December 2013, following a 59-36 confirmation vote, John Koskinen was 
sworn in as the new IRS Commissioner.24  The FBI investigation ultimately found 
evidence of “a mismanaged bureaucracy enforcing rules about tax-exemption”, but 
did not find the indiscretion to rise to the level of violation of criminal law, further 
exacerbating the Republican legislators’ political suspicions.25  During an address to 
the National Press Club in April 2014, John Koskinen stated that the IRS had spent 
close to $14 million in ensuring compliance and cooperation with various ongoing 
investigations related to the scandal, including four separate congressional 
investigations.26  In May 2014, the House of Representatives, dissatisfied with 
Lerner’s lack of cooperation in clarifying her role in the administration of the 
program, passed H. Res. 574 by a vote of 231-to-187, holding Lerner in contempt of 
Congress for refusal to comply with subpoenas issued by the Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform.27  
The IRS’s internal oversight of the emails that were subject of congressional 
investigation was furthered questioned when in June 2014, the Agency told Congress 
that it had “determined that Ms. Lerner’s computer [had] crashed in mid-2011,” and 
that some of her emails were lost.28  The Treasury Department and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) continued to investigate whether the disappearance of the emails 
could be linked to any criminal activity.29  DOJ announced that it would not pursue 
criminal contempt charges against Lois Lerner, finding that she had not waived her 
Fifth Amendment rights and advised Congress that DOJ’s own investigation would 
also not result in filing of charges against Lerner.  Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-
UT) and the House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) turned 
their attention to the IRS Commissioner John Koskinen.30  
                                                          
20 Ed O’Keefe, Lois Lerner Put on Administrative Leave by IRS, WASH. POST (May 23, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/05/23/lois-lerner-put-on-administrative-
leave/?utm_term=.091f52b9cb0d.  
21 Lauren French, IRS Bonuses Fuel GOP Anger, POLITICO (July 19, 2013), http://www.POLIT-
ICO.com/story/2013/06/chuck-grassley-irs-to-pay-70m-in-employee-bonuses-093044.  
22  C.J. Ciaramella, Ex-IRS official Lois Lerner Received $129,000 in Bonuses, Records Show, FOX NEWS 
(Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/02/25/ex-irs-official-lois-lerner-received-12000-in-bo-
nuses-records-show.html.  
23  Bade, supra note 13.  
24  Erb, supra note 12. 
25 Devlin Barret, Criminal Charges Not Expected in IRS Probe, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303819704579318983271821584. 
26  Erb, supra note 12. 
27  Ed O’Keefe, Post Politics House Votes to Hold Lois Lerner in Contempt of Congress, WASH. POST 
(May 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/05/07/house-votes-to-hold-lois-
lerner-in-contempt-of-congress/?utm_term=.d98c772a0f7a; Erb, supra note 12. 
28  Bade, supra note 13. 
29  Id.; see also Erb, supra note 12. 
30  Rachael Bade & John Bresnahan, DOJ: No Contempt Charges for Former IRS Official Lerner, POLIT-
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Koskinen’s tenure at the IRS began years after the alleged misconduct at the 
IRS local branches had already taken place, but members of the House believed that 
Koskinen’s internal management of the Agency obstructed the congressional 
investigation process.31  In February 2014, eight weeks after Koskinen had taken the 
helms at the IRS, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee issued a 
subpoena asking for any and all emails to and from Lois Lerner and others in the 
Cincinnati and Washington offices involving those in charge of making decisions 
about non-exempt status scrutiny.  Generally, the dissatisfaction expressed by the 
members of the House emanated from the time it took the Agency to notify the 
Committee that career officials in West Virginia had erased backup tapes containing 
many of Lerner’s emails that would have been covered by the subpoena.32  Although 
many members of the House called for Koskinen’s impeachment,33 the House 
Oversight Committee eventually voted to censure the IRS Commissioner for 
engaging “in a pattern of conduct inconsistent with the trust and confidence placed 
in him.”34  The Republican voices in the House claimed that the existence of the 
subpoena imposed a legal duty on the Commissioner to preserve all relevant 
documents, while many Democratic leaders found absence of malicious intent to 
obstruct to be critical in absolving Koskinen of any wrongdoing.35  More specifically, 
the Republican members pointed to Koskinen’s comments before the Senate Finance 
Committee in Spring 2014—which expressed his belief that every email had been 
preserved—as indication that Koskinen attempted to mislead the lawmakers.36  The 
House Resolution also expressed the sense of the House that Koskinen should be 
barred from receiving his pension, a move that lacks any legally binding effect.37  At 
the conclusion of the investigations, Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD), Ranking 
Member of the House Oversight Committee, announced that the investigation into 
the IRS handling of the tax-exempt scandal had cost taxpayers $20 million.38 
                                                          
ICO (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.POLITICO.com/story/2015/04/lois-lerner-no-contempt-charges-justice-depart-
ment-116577.  
31  Erb, supra note 12. 
32  Norm Ornstein, The Show Trial of IRS Commissioner John Koskinen, THE ATLANTIC (June 22, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/the-show-trial-of-irs-commissioner-john-
koskinen/488147/. 
33  Katy O’Donnell, House Panel Votes to Censure Koskinen, POLITICO (July 15, 2016), http://www.PO-
LITICO.com/story/2016/06/john-koskinen-house-censure-224374. 
34  Id.  In expressing the sense of dissatisfaction shared by the Republican members of the House in 
imposing punishment on Koskinen, Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-UT), the Chairman of the House Over-
sight and Government Reform Committee stated, “We’re left with no other remedy.  The F.B.I. is not going to 
take action.  The President is not going to take action, but clearly he provided false testimony.”  David M. 
Herszenhorn & Jackie Calmes, House to Consider I.R.S. Commissioner’s Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/us/politics/house-set-to-begin-irs-commissioners-impeachment-
hearing.html.  
35  O’Donnell, supra note 33; Lisa Rein, Republicans censure IRS chief they accuse of lying to Congress, 
WASH. POST (June 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/06/15/irs-chief-cen-
sured-by-gop-lawmakers-in-rare-vote-over-treatment-of-conservatives/?utm_term=.e3b58e717b54. 
36  Lynnley Browning & Henri Gendreau, IRS Chief Koskinen Calls Impeachment ‘Improper’ at Hearing, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-09-21/irs-chief-koskinen-
calls-impeachment-improper-during-hearing.  
37  O’Donnell, supra note 33. 
38  Bade, supra note 13. 
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III.  CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER 
Congress’s investigatory powers are historically linked to the transfer of 
similar powers as exercised by the English House of Commons.39  The House of 
Commons itself exercised its investigatory powers based on the presumption that the 
power to obtain the information necessary for lawmaking is incidental to, and a 
necessary condition for, carrying out the privilege of law-making.40  In the 
foundational case McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that 
powers that are necessary for the preservation of an express grant of power and are 
reasonably appropriate for carrying out that power are assumed to accompany that 
grant of power.41  Principally, this rule indicates that the Constitution’s grant of “all 
legislative power” to Congress, implies the power to investigate and obtain the 
information necessary for legislating.42  Congress’s power to investigate is deemed 
to operate at its peak when the subject of inquiry is “waste, fraud, abuse, or 
maladministration within a government department.”43 
To ensure the effectiveness of its investigational process, Congress is also 
armed with contempt power.44  Although the most recent exercises of the contempt 
power have been closely associated with addressing noncompliance with 
congressional subpoenas, the Supreme Court has recognized that the scope of the 
contempt power extends to all actions designed to “remov[e] an existing obstruction 
to the performance of [the legislature’s] duties.”45  This understanding imposes two 
restrictions on Congress’s contempt power.  First, Congress’s use of its contempt 
power to remove obstructions can only be exercised in furtherance of a legislative 
purpose.  For example, if it is evident that Congress’s true intention in using the 
contempt power has been to aid the prosecution of pending law suits, its powers can 
be restricted.46  Second, Congress’s contempt power should only be used to combat 
those actions that directly “obstruct its deliberative proceedings.”47  Refusal to appear 
for testimony before a committee or a refusal to produce requested documents can 
constitute this form of obstruction.48 
When noncompliance with a duly-issued congressional subpoena persists, 
Congress maintains a number of options in exercising its power to punish for 
contempt.  First, Congress preserves the extreme power to physically arrest and 
detain the individual responsible for the obstruction, under what is known as the 
                                                          
39  See Potts, supra note 7, at 669, 708.  Further evidence of this direct transfer of power from the House 
of Commons to the legislative bodies in America can be shown through the examples of the earliest uses of the 
legislative contempt power by the colonial state assemblies in states such as New York and Virginia.  Id. at 
701–06. 
40  John W. Gilligan, Congressional Investigations, 41 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 618, 618 (1951). 
41  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 408 (1819); see also Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 218–19 
(1821) (“The necessity of self-defence is as incidental to legislative, as to judicial authority.”). 
42  See U.S. CONST. art. I, §1; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927) (“In actual legislative 
practice, power to secure needed information by such means has long been treated as an attribute of the power 
to legislate.”). 
43  GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, at 7. 
44  See generally id. 
45  See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147 (1935). 
46  See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).  See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 
(1880) (finding that Congress could not use its investigatory power to inquire into individuals’ personal lives). 
47  GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
48  Id. at 5–6. 
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“inherent contempt power.”49  This power is carried out through an order to the 
Sergeant-in-Arms of Congress, and the contemnor can be held in custody until the 
information sought is provided or until the end of the legislative session.50  However, 
given the unseemly nature of practicing this power, Congress has not leveraged its 
inherent contempt powers since 1935.51 
As a second option, pursuant to the criminal contempt statute, first enacted 
in 1857 and codified today at 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194, Congress has the power to 
certify a contempt citation that presents the U.S. Attorney General with the 
opportunity for criminal prosecution of the contemnor.52  The criminal contempt 
statute was envisioned to be a substitute for the inherent contempt power, and the 
legislative history behind the Act suggests that the lawmakers perceived the law to 
apply to executive branch officials.53 
Third, Congress may decide to pursue civil litigation in order to obtain a 
federal judgment declaring that the contemnor is legally obligated to comply with 
congressional subpoenas.  Civil action is a particularly attractive option for Congress 
when the subpoena is directed at federal officials, as the Department of Justice is 
often reluctant to pursue criminal action in those situations, particularly if the law 
suit is deemed to implicate issues of executive privilege.54  Currently, institutional 
standing to bring civil suits in federal courts is based on an existing statutory authority 
in the Senate and established through separate House resolutions for committees in 
the House.55  In both criminal contempt suits and civil litigation, Congress’s objective 
is to hold the opposing party in contempt of court.56  Noncompliance with a court 
order can then result in contempt sanctions issued by the court.  Court sanctions can 
take the form of a civil coercive sanction which includes imprisonment or issuance 
of periodic fines until compliance is achieved.57 
 
                                                          
49  The power to “fix a prolonged term of imprisonment” was also practice by the House of Commons in 
its contempt power and transferred in whole to the American legislative body.  See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 
U.S. 521, 533 (1917). 
50  GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, at 8; see also Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. at 231 (1821). 
51  GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, at 17.  Hesitance to subject federal officials to physical arrest is not 
unique to the legislative branch, Article III courts armed with the same contempt power are also “adamantly 
averse” to exercising that privilege, historically reserving that power for “exceptional incidents.”  See Nicholas 
R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt 
Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 745 (2018). 
52  2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2012). 
53  GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, at 42–43 (citing 42 CONG. GLOBE 429 (statement of Rep. Marshall) 
(1857)). 
54  See Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel on Prosecution for the Contempt of Congress of 
an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of 
Executive Privilege, to the U.S. Attorney Gen. 140 (May 30, 1984) (on file with author)(“Thus, when the 
major impact on the President's ability to exercise his constitutionally mandated function is balanced against 
the relatively slight imposition on Congress in requiring it to resort to a civil rather than a criminal remedy to 
pursue its legitimate needs, we believe that the constitutionally mandated separation of powers requires the 
statute to be interpreted so as not to apply to Presidential assertions of executive privilege.”).  
55  House resolutions often include the civil contempt resolutions and empower the Committee in charge 
of the investigation to sue the contemnor on behalf of the body.  See e.g., John Bresnahan & Seung Min Kim, 
Holder Held in Contempt, POLITICO (July 28, 2012), http://www.Politico.com/story/2012/06/holder-held-in-
contempt-077988 
56  GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, at 27. 
57  MOORE'S MANUAL—FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 10A.20 (2015). 
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A. CURRENT CHALLENGES IN ENFORCING CONGRESSIONAL CONTEMPT POWER 
AGAINST AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIAL  
Despite the number of alternative approaches available to the members of 
Congress in exercising the contempt power, all the aforementioned remedies have 
recently developed their own problems.  The inherent contempt power has 
understandably grown to be viewed as an unseemly and particularly inefficient 
method of ensuring compliance from executive officers.58  Similarly, the power to 
remove obstructions through criminal contempt statutes faces predictable political 
challenges that arise out of DOJ’s discretion in refusing to file criminal charges.  
Although the criminal contempt statute provides that “it shall be” the duty of the U.S. 
Attorney “to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action,” absent conclusive 
judicial determination to the contrary, DOJ has refused to present the grand jury with 
contempt citations issued in many cases.59  Most recently, in four high-profile 
investigations involving sitting or former senior executive officials and cabinet 
members (former White House Counsel Harriet Miers, EPA Administrator Anne 
Gorsuch Burford, White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, and Attorney General 
Eric Holder), a certification of contempt citation to the U.S. Attorney for the District 
of Columbia by Congress did not result in filing of criminal charges.60  In these cases, 
DOJ refused to file criminal charges, either citing its belief that the protections of 
executive privilege bar the attorneys from filing charges or that the Department does 
not find the actions targeted by the contempt citation to constitute a federal crime.61 
As Congress has become more accustomed to the futility of relying on the 
executive branch for criminal prosecution of federal officials found in contempt of 
Congress, the House has developed the practice of accompanying its criminal 
contempt resolution with resolutions authorizing agents to seek civil enforcement of 
congressional subpoenas.62  However, this avenue faces its own practical limitations 
and challenges.  First, because the main aim of resorting to assistance from the 
judicial branch in civil litigation is to force compliance with a duly issued subpoena, 
the courts are presented with politically sensitive challenges that might increase the 
possibility of triggering the political question doctrine in dismissing the case.63  More 
importantly, the larger issue contributing to the ineffectiveness of civil litigation is 
that this option is exceedingly more costly and time consuming.64  Understandably, 
                                                          
58  GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, at 22. 
59  Id. at 27.  
60  Id. at 52.  In the context of the contempt citation issued against Attorney General Eric Holder, Deputy 
Attorney general James Cole informed the House on the same day that the Department will not bring the citation 
before the grand jury, as the Department had determined that the Attorney General’s actions did not constitute 
a crime.  Id. 
61  Id. at 55. 
62  Id. at 52. 
63  Id. at 30 (citing comments by the then-Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia positing that such 
cases involve “the very type of ‘political question’ from which ... the courts [should] abstain.”); U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Holder, No. 12-1332, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140994, at *28 (D.D.C. 2013) (refusing to 
dismiss the case under the political question doctrine). 
64  See CONSTITUTION PROJECT, Separation of Powers and Congressional Oversight, Part 1, C-SPAN, 
1:00:00 (Oct. 25, 2016) (discussing the factor of time in pursuing civil litigation in the context of congressional 
investigations), https://www.c-span.org/video/?417428-1/discussion-focuses-separation-powers-congres-
sional-oversight&start=4560; see also Prosecution of Contempt of Congress: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Admin. Law and Gov’t Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 24 (1983) 
(statement of Stanley Brand) (“As a lawyer involved in civil litigation, if you allow me to set foot into 
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a conglomeration of these limitations completely dismantles Congress’s efforts to 
conduct fruitful investigations of high-profile matters involving senior executive 
officers, as the IRS investigations show.  In this light, the discussion of other potential 
avenues for redress can open up possibilities for resolving this delicate issue of 
separation of powers without risking a constitutional crisis. 
Entertaining new options for enforcement of subpoenas will rejuvenate 
congressional investigations and restore the legislative branch’s equal status.  First, 
as the Court noted in McGrain v. Daugherty, “[a] legislative body cannot legislate 
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which 
the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does 
not itself possess the requisite information … recourse must be had to others who 
possess it.”65  In the context of the IRS investigations, remedial agency regulations, 
which are drafted by the IRS and the Treasury Department pursuant to the rulemaking 
power previously delegated to them, ultimately replaced potential standalone 
legislative reform that could have arisen out of a full investigation by Congress.66  
The growth of the administrative state, in conjunction with the executive branch’s 
growing willingness to assert executive privilege in withholding information relating 
to the internal process of the agencies from Congress,67 effectively ensures that the 
administrative agencies expand their power to legislate in response to scandals at the 
expense of the legislative body that finds itself unable to obtain the requisite 
information to frame a legislative response.68  
Second, Congress’s investigatory power has always been intrinsically linked 
with Congress’s appropriation power.69  As more popular criticism of the increasing 
cost of congressional investigations amass, a new approach that is focused on reining 
in this cost can show that Congress is serious about self-preserving the power of the 
purse and ensuring fiscal accountability.70  The two aforementioned justifications for 
restoring Congress’s contempt power coalesce in the most recent perceptible trends 
in the relationship between the federal courts and the federal agencies in the context 
                                                          
Federal district court to litigate a claim of privilege, I can guarantee you I will be there for at least 3 years, well 
beyond the time it takes for this Congress to go through one of its 2-year cycles.”). 
65  McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174–75 (1927). 
66  Statement for the Record: The Internal Revenue Service’s Response to Committee Recommendations 
Contained in Its August 5, 2015 Report, 114th Cong. 92 (2015) (statement of Stephen Spaulding , Senior Policy 
Counsel & Legal Dir., U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin.) https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/22724.pdf.  
67  See generally TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL42670, PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECU-
TIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2012). 
68  Courts have already shown concern for this problem, recognizing that sometimes Congress’s investi-
gator power may be necessary in order to decide “not to legislate” or “what to appropriate.”  See Barenblatt v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) (emphasis added). 
69  See id. at 111 (“[Congress’s power to investigate] has similarly been utilized in determining what to 
appropriate from the national purse, or whether to appropriate.”).  In fact, historical survey of legislative inves-
tigation as practiced in colonial America shows that even the earliest instances of legislative investigation by 
colonial assemblies were intrinsically tied with the legislative bodies’ power of the purse.  The Massachusetts 
House of Representatives defined the reach of its investigatory power to extend to “any Officer in the pay and 
service of [the] government” with the goal of obtaining information about “the account of [their] [m]anagement 
in while in the Public Employ.”  Potts, supra note 7, at 708. 
70  Ecochamberlain, Adding up the Billions Wasted by the House Republicans, DAILY KOS (Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/9/1/1326246/-Adding-up-the-billions-wasted-by-the-House-Republi-
cans.  It is important to note that the legislative history behind the criminal contempt statute—Congress’s last 
attempt at expanding its contempt power—indicates that the sponsors found the law’s potential in safeguarding 
the House’s appropriation power to be a defense of its constitutionality.  See GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, 
at 38-39. 
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of unruly agency behavior.  Recent evidence suggests that federal courts are 
increasingly and uniformly less likely to sanction federal officials who have been 
held in contempt of court and have nonetheless continued to ignore judicial orders.71  
Survey of past practice among federal courts shows that although federal judges have 
in principle defended their power to attach sanctions to contempt findings—by 
imposing either imprisonment or individual fines against officials—they have shown 
“virtually complete unwillingness” to carry out those sanctions.72  In the specific case 
of imposition of compensatory or coercive fines on federal officials, the courts’ 
restrained approach can be attributed to two separation of powers principles: (1) DOJ 
has repeatedly invoked the principle of federal sovereign immunity in arguing that 
fines against federal agencies are barred,73 and (2) the Appropriation Clause’s 
mandate that no money can be drawn from the treasury unless Congress appropriates 
creates legal uncertainty as to whether federal funds could be used for judicial 
penalties.74  Therefore, in the usual battles between the federal courts and the federal 
agencies, where federal courts are entertaining the use of their equitable discretion to 
force agency compliance with a court order through contempt sanctions, stonewalling 
by the agencies is known to result in prolonged negotiations that can take up to six 
years before federal judges exercise their equitable power to find agency officials in 
contempt of court.75  In rare instances where district courts have resorted to attaching 
sanctions to their contempt findings—either imposing fines or ordering 
imprisonment against federal officials—higher courts have intervened, often at last 
minute, to block enforcement of sanctions based on technical reasons, always 
circumventing any pronouncements that would call into question the court’s 
constitutional power to issue said sanctions.76  Therefore, courts remain silent on 
whether monetary penalties against recalcitrant federal officers are constitutionally 
available in principle, yet they are clearly burdened by an institutionalized sense of 
political discomfort and unease in enforcing such sanctions.77  However, the field of 
appropriation law, foreclosing Article III solutions to curbing unruly agency actions, 
invites congressional action to occupy that empty space. 
 
B. IMPOSITION OF MONETARY FINES ON EXECUTIVE OFFICERS FOR 
CONTEMPTUOUS BEHAVIOR  
With no other conceivable avenue for redress in the IRS investigations, 
members of the House opened discussions about innovative ways to combat the 
Agency and the Commissioner’s perceived disobedience.  Many legislators 
recommended using impeachment powers to rectify their concerns.78  The fact that 
Koskinen would have been the first appointed executive branch official to face 
impeachment since 1876 testifies to the sense of exasperation among legislative 
officials on shortcomings of their investigatory powers and their inability to punish 
                                                          
71  See generally Parrillo, supra note 51, at 773. 
72  Id. at 686, 697. 
73  Id. at 712–26. 
74  Id. at 693, 738–71. 
75  Id. at 689 n.13. 
76  Id. at 757–58. 
77  Id. at 766. 
78  Herszenhorn & Calmes, supra note 34. 
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contemnors.79  Nonetheless, many legal commentators found the use of impeachment 
powers to be inappropriate and unsupported.80  Proposed resolutions also aimed to 
reduce Chief Koskinen’s federal salary to zero but were rejected in the House, despite 
widespread support from many prominent Republican officials including the House 
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R-Texas).81  Similarly, it was 
widely reported that Congress lacked the power to pass a resolution denying 
Koskinen his pension and other federal benefits based on the understanding that this 
power will implicate the Bill of Attainder Clause of the Constitution.82  However, the 
constitutional dilemmas surrounding these mentioned proposals are exceedingly less 
pronounced in the context of a different innovative reproach, namely that of issuing 
contempt citations in the nature of monetary fines. 
Although the power to issue contempt citations that impose monetary fines 
has never been practiced,83 there are few reasons to believe that Congress does indeed 
possess this power.  First, prior judicial pronouncements on the scope of Congress’s 
investigative authority, which have shaped Congress’s approach to practicing this 
power over the years, include distinctly broad and permissive language.  Most 
famously, in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, the Court affirmatively 
declared that “[t]he scope of [Congress’s] power of inquiry ... is as penetrating and 
far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”84  
Such language affirms the general understanding that the outer boundaries of 
Congress’s power in this area remain largely unclear and unexplored.   
Moreover, in many other areas of constitutional law where clear 
constitutional grants of power to either branch do not present clear standards for 
judges to determine the exact contours of that delegated power, legal theory often 
resorts to the famous maxim that the greater power equals the lesser.85  Justice 
Holmes elucidated this principle by stating that "[e]ven in the law the whole generally 
includes its parts.  If the State may prohibit, it may prohibit with the privilege of 
avoiding the prohibition in a certain way."86  Federal courts have used the principle 
in defining the boundaries of their own contempt powers.  In Hutto v. Finney, the 
Supreme Court tackled the constitutionality of judicial awards of attorneys’ fee 
                                                          
79  Lynnley Browning, IRS Chief Koskinen Fights First Appointee Impeachment Since 1876, BLOOMBERG 
(June 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-06-21/irs-chief-koskinen-fights-first-ap-
pointee-impeachment-since-1876.  
80  Kelly Phillips Erb, More Than 100 Law Professors to Congress: Impeaching the IRS Commissioner 
is a Bad Idea, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2016/08/30/more-than-
100-law-professors-to-congress-impeaching-the-irs-commissioner-is-a-bad-idea/#434a16315d91.  
81  Naomi Jagoda, House Rejects Measure to cut IRS Chief's Salary to Zero, THE HILL (July 7, 2016), 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/286913-house-rejects-amendment-to-cut-irs-heads-salary-to-zero.  
82  O’Donnell, supra note 33. 
83  GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, at 16. 
84  421 U.S. 491, 504, n.15 (1975) (quoting Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. at 111). 
85  See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340–44 (1986) (“[T]he greater 
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino 
gambling.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (finding that the grant of greater power to kill includes the 
lesser power to detain); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction 
of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 54–55 (1975) (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850), applying the greater means lesser 
argument in deciding that Congress’s power to create federal courts means the power to restrict their jurisdic-
tion).  Some previous Court decisions also suggest that the contempt power itself can be considered a lesser 
power derived from the greater express power to impeach.  See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. at 210. 
86  Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910). 
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against state officials who had violated court injunctions; by analogizing to the scope 
of the courts’ contempt power, the Court stated that “principles of federalism that 
inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to enforce 
their decrees only by sending high state officials to jail.  The less intrusive power to 
impose a fine is properly treated as ancillary to the federal court’s power to impose 
injunctive relief.”87  In the case of Congress’s investigatory power and, more 
specifically, congressional contempt power, the greater power to physically detain 
and jail a contemnor is not a mere theoretical assertion, but a power traditionally 
exercised by Congress in numerous instances and affirmatively upheld by the 
courts.88  Furthermore, other constitutional constraints that already limit Congress’s 
imposition of fines and penalties on federal employees (or deduction of federal 
salaries) can guarantee that the power to fine or to garnish federal salaries of those 
who are in contempt of Congress, in practice, imposes a monetary harm of lesser 
severity than the greater power to physically detain.89  
Additionally, previous Supreme Court opinions on other subjects of first 
impression involving Congress’s investigatory power and the contempt power have 
repeatedly relied on comparisons with contempt proceedings as they are practiced in 
the judicial branch, as the closest available analogy.  As an example, in analyzing 
whether an unsworn committee report can form the basis for a warrant issued by the 
Senate subcommittee, the Court in McGrain v. Daugherty drew an analogy between 
the congressional contempt power and the power of courts of law to punish 
contemptuous behavior committed in their presence.90  Finding that the court of law 
possessed the power to “order commitments without other proof than their own 
knowledge of the occurrence,” the Court found that the same power must extend to 
the legislative branch and the congressional committees in charge of investigation in 
carrying out the same quasi-judicial process.91  Similarly, in Kilbourn v. Thompson,92 
in analyzing the scope of another quasi-judicial function carried out by Congress—
that of trying and impeaching government officials—the Court resorted to the same 
analogy between the contempt remedies available to the courts of law and the power 
invested in congressional committees charged with carrying out that quasi-judicial 
power.  Justice Miller noted that that the congressional body in charge of an 
investigation should be able to carry out that duty “in the same manner and by the 
use of the same means that courts of justice can in like cases.”93  The Court then 
acknowledged, in dicta, that a power to punish by “fine or imprisonment” is 
                                                          
87  Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690–91 (1978).   
88  GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 4, at 15–17. 
89  As an example, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 clarifies the amount of disposable earning that can be legally sub-
jected to garnishment. 
90  McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 157 (1927). 
91  In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), Justice Miller noted that some similarities between 
investigatory powers of the legislative body and adjudicatory powers of courts of law stem from the historical 
fact that the power of congressional investigation, as endorsed by the American constitution, was derived from 
the practice of the English House of Commons, and that House functioned “as a court as well as a legislative 
body.”  Potts, supra note 7, at 720.  Neither does grating the same power to Congress mean that its powers of 
investigation will be aggrandized at the expense of the judicial branch, as this rule dictates that Congress will 
be bound by the same due process restrictions that the courts of law are bound by.  See Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) at 217 (“[T]he rights of congress on the subject of contempts, have been considered similar and equal 
to those of the federal courts.”); see also Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972) (finding that contempt proceed-
ing should comply with the same due process requirements as court proceedings). 
92  Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. at 190. 
93  Id. at 190. 
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conceivable so long that the power is carried out in relation to an expressly granted 
authority.94  
The contempt power belonging to the federal courts in the United States has 
historically been perceived to encompass the power to impose fines on the 
contemnor, with the Judiciary Act of 1789 stating that the federal courts will have 
the power to punish “[a]ll contempts of authority” by “fine or imprisonment,” finding 
the two powers synonymous.95  Furthermore, the same conclusion follows from the 
symmetry of separation of powers incident to the equal status of all three branches of 
government.  It has already been recognized and accepted that in controlling its own 
internal procedures, the judicial branch can participate in quasi-legislative functions 
by fashioning its own rules of civil and criminal procedure.96  These rules then give 
way to various avenues of civil and criminal contempt exercised by the courts, which 
include imposition of monetary fines and penalties.97  It would logically follow that 
in carrying out a legislative function, namely investigation, Congress should be 
granted the quasi-judicial powers to issue monetary fines.   
The final justification for Congress’s power to impose fines on contemnors 
also arises from previous Supreme Court decisions that elevate and recognize the 
status of contempt powers possessed by the congressional investigatory bodies to that 
possessed by traditional courts of law.  In Anderson v. Dunn, in analyzing whether 
the House possessed the relatively more extreme power to jail a contemnor, Justice 
White observed that denying Congress the contempt power was inconsistent with the 
understanding that the same power was available “even to the most inferior 
magistrates.”98  This language indicates that reference to the scope of contempt power 
exercised by other quasi-judicial bodies that have inferior status to congressional 
bodies, and the scope of duties assigned to the officers residing over those tribunals, 
can help assess the exact scope of contempt power available to congressional 
committees.  Administrative agencies charged with quasi-judicial functions serve as 
an example of a tribunal of inferior status.  Although the Supreme Court in ICC v. 
Brimson foreclosed administrative agencies’ use of “authority to compel obedience 
to [their] orders by a judgment of fine or imprisonment,” more recently courts have 
attempted to reconcile Brimson’s language with cases that followed that decision and 
showed much greater deference toward quasi-adjudicative practices by 
administrative agencies.99  In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States Department of 
Energy, the D.C. Circuit, recognizing that Brimson was decided long before “the 
advent of the ‘modern administrative state’” held that “broad congressional power to 
                                                          
94  Id. 
95  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 76.  Today, 18 U.S.C. § 401 codifies the contempt 
power and gives the federal courts the “power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion,” any 
disobedience in complying with the court’s orders.  For a survey of instances where federal courts have issued 
individual contempt fines against federal officials or fines that aim to dock agency appropriation, see Parrillo, 
supra note 51, at 53–58. 
96  See generally Alexander Volokh, The Inherent-Power Corollary: Judicial Non-Delegation and Fed-
eral Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391 (2015).  
97  Sasha Volokh, Can Congress Delegate Procedural Rulemaking Power to Courts?, WASH. POST (Aug. 
25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/25/can-congress-delegate-
procedural-rulemaking-power-to-courts/?utm_term=.ee29c81e8a14; see also Joseph J. Janatka, The Inherent 
Power: An Obscure Doctrine Confronts Due Process, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 429, 431 (1987) (“Generally, courts 
impose penalties upon attorneys in response to negligently caused inconvenience, delay, intentional obstructions 
of justice; failure to appear; discovery abuses; default; etc.”). 
98  See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. at 219. 
99  ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894). 
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authorize agencies to adjudicate ‘public rights’ necessarily carries with it power to 
authorize an agency to take such procedural actions as may be necessary to maintain 
the integrity of the agency's adjudicatory proceedings.”100  The Circuit Court 
proceeded to limit the reach of Brimson to prohibiting administrative agencies from 
issuing punitive fines or imprisonment without judicial involvement, but upheld the 
Department of Energy’s power to impose discovery sanctions administratively and 
without prior court approval so long as some avenues for judicial review remained.  
Furthermore, since the days of Brimson, other inferior judicial officers such as 
magistrate judges have been increasingly granted more expansive contempt power.101  
The justification for granting contempt power in the form of imposition of monetary 
fines to both administrative tribunals and magistrate judges has mimicked the same 
reasoning that has justified Congress’s inherent power to detain contemnors—
namely, that any quasi-judicial body should be armed with the reasonable tools to 
remove obstructions to the administration of justice.  The Court’s reasoning in 
Anderson therefore would dictate that Congress can exercise the power to issue fines, 
as this power is currently invested in other inferior magistrates such as federal 
magistrate judges and quasi-judicial bodies of administrative agencies. 
  
C. THE NEW CONTEMPT POWER AND INSTITUTIONAL BENEFITS 
Substituting the old practices in exercising the inherent contempt power with 
the new approach of imposition of fines or penalties, akin to the power exercised by 
federal courts, can prove to be fairly useful in facilitating the legislative branch’s 
attempts to reclaim its investigative power in scenarios such as the IRS 
investigations.  In conjunction with other statutory requirements imposed on the 
federal agencies to collect any debt owed to the United States by their employees, the 
imposition of fines can facilitate Congress’s reaction to contemptuous behavior and 
ensure compliance in a timelier manner.  As an example, refusal to comply with 
contempt citations and payment of fines can further trigger possibility of wage 
garnishment for federal employees. Previous exercises of appropriation power in 
targeting public officials’ salaries are outside the context of congressional contempt 
power and often involve attempts by lawmakers to bring about indirect removal of 
an official or to impose accountability for an otherwise dissatisfactory 
performance.102  Many of these past congressional attempts at halting salary 
payments for executive officers have been deemed to violate clear constitutional 
principles such as the prohibition against bills of attainder or the presidential removal 
powers.103  The courts’ analysis of the scope of appropriation powers in other areas 
of separation of powers generally supports the maxim that Congress cannot use its 
appropriation powers to “accomplish an unconstitutional objective.”104  Any analysis 
                                                          
100  Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
101  See 28 U.S. Code § 636 (2015) (“A magistrate judge shall have the power to punish summarily by 
fine or imprisonment, or both, such contempt of the authority of such magistrate judge constituting misbehavior 
of any person in the magistrate judge's presence so as to obstruct the administration of justice.  The order of 
contempt shall be issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (2000)”). 
102  See L. Anthony Sutin, Check, Please: Constitutional Dimensions of Halting the Pay of Public Offi-
cials, 26 J. LEGIS. 221, 222 (2000). 
103  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) ("Congress has 
plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that 
authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction."). 
104  Sutin, supra note 102, at 225. 
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of Congress’s potential violation of separation of powers by abusing its appropriation 
powers will, therefore, likely entail consideration of the exact concerns that drove 
Congress’s decision to restrict funding.105   
Accordingly, Congress cannot use its appropriation powers to enlarge 
congressional power at the expense of other branches or to encroach on powers 
directly granted to the other branches.106  As an example, although Congress does not 
have the power to refuse appropriation of funds for the President to make treaties, 
because that power is expressly delegated to the President, it may deny appropriations 
to implement finished treaties because the House preserves the general power to 
ensure fiscal responsibility.107  Similarly, in the context of determining whether the 
House has acted pursuant to the Constitution in its practice of determining the budget 
appropriated to the federal courts, the Supreme Court has focused on assessing 
whether the objective behind appropriation decisions has been to promote fiscal 
accountability or the illicit desire to frustrate the judicial branch’s power to carry out 
its obligations.108  This subtle difference distinguishes the theoretical use of contempt 
fines which are commensurate with the cost of congressional investigations and are 
mainly designed to compensate congressional committees for the fiscal burdens 
arising out of noncompliance with subpoenas, from Congress’s previous attempts at 
targeting public officials’ salaries, which often had the illicit purpose of removing 
those officials from office.  
In 1943, after investigations by the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities identified three federal employees to be linked with Communist 
organizations, the Special Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee passed an 
amendment to the annual appropriation bill that relied on the Committee’s findings 
in denying any appropriated money for the use of salary or compensation payment to 
those named federal employees.  In United States v. Lovett, Justice Black held that 
the appropriation amendment was an unconstitutional bill of attainder.109  The Lovett 
principle, as it came to be, stands for the proposition that “no pay provisions” directed 
at specifically named officials, with the intent to punish those officers for asserted 
wrongdoings, violate the Bill of Attainder Clause of the Constitution.110  
Accordingly, it can be argued that issuance of contempt citations that impose fines in 
response to refusals to comply with subpoenas could potentially run afoul of the 
Lovett principle.  However, a congressional plan designed to include a wage 
garnishment provision in the annual appropriation bills directed at officers who have 
refused to pay contempt fines can be distinguished from the cases that involve the 
Lovett principle.  This is principally because the Courts are often faced with clear 
evidence of Congress’s intent to indirectly remove an officer in cases involving the 
Lovett principle, but congressional fines in the context of contempt power can have 
clear indicia of Congress’s legitimate goal to retain its fiscal accountability and, to 
that end, can be clearly assessed to merely reimburse the committees for the 
                                                          
105  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). 
106  J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1166 (1989). 
107  Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 758, 762 
(1989).  
108  See generally Todd D. Peterson, Controlling the Federal Courts Through the Appropriation Process, 
1998 WIS. L. REV. 993 (1998). 
109  United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). 
110  Sutin, supra note 102, at 230. 
  
 Journal of Legislation 251 
additional cost imposed by refusal to comply with subpoenas.111  As previously 
discussed, the federal courts have shown unwillingness to sanction federal officials 
with contempt fines precisely due to respect for the congressional power of the 
purse.112  It can, therefore, be presumed that when congressional attempts to deduct 
the salary of a federal official who has refused payment of a contempt fine are 
supported by evidence showing the legislative intent to recoup the necessary 
additional cost for continuing the congressional investigation, neither the power to 
issue the fine nor the subsequent wage garnishment would violate the Constitution.  
This is because the courts will likely not view such actions as naked attempts to 
aggrandize or enlarge congressional power at the expense of the executive office; 
rather they can find such actions justified as attempts to protect inherently 
congressional powers, such as the power of the purse, against executive 
encroachment.113 
Specifically, this new approach can be modeled after both Congressional 
Houses’ power to issue fines for disciplinary purposes against their own members.114  
Although infrequently utilized, the House has previously issued monetary fines 
against its own members commensurate with all or some of the cost of the 
investigations into their behavior.115  Members have also been fined in the amount 
necessary to reimburse the body for misuse of committee appropriations.116  This 
historical precedent, in conjunction with other court pronouncements highlighting the 
necessity of preserving Congress’s appropriation powers, suggests that both houses 
of Congress may possess the power to impose monetary fines against contemnors 
when any refusal to comply with a subpoena can be reasonably linked to additional 
costs imposed on the investigatory body. 
Inherent contempt proceedings do not require discretionary cooperation 
from the Executive Branch; they thereby avoid scenarios similar to the IRS 
investigation where Congress’s attempt at enforcement of subpoenas is ultimately 
diverted by the Department of Justice’s discretionary power to not pursue criminal 
charges.117  Unlike the criminal contempt statute, the argument outlined in this Article 
does not necessitate that Congress presents the president with a separate statute and 
obtain presidential signature for issuing contempt citations.  Instead, the power to 
issue fines will be exercised in a similar fashion to the inherent contempt power to 
detain and its further enforcement in the case of refusal by federal officials to pay 
fines can be done through appropriation riders which leverage significantly more 
power against the president.118  
Finally, it is likely that the power to issue fines and penalties will require 
similar pre-enforcement procedural requirements as the inherent contempt 
proceeding.  This means that the imposition of fines will likely be proceeded by a 
trial-like process of fact-finding and examination of findings and records, before 
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recommendation to the full body is made.119  By inviting participation from other 
committees beyond the select investigation committees, such as the House Ways and 
Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee, this avenue is likely to reduce 
conflicts that might arise among subcommittees with regards to overreach of power, 
invite participation from other committees, and increase the likelihood of producing 
a final resolution that has the support of the majority of the body.120 
CONCLUSION 
As political partisanship intensifies and the legislative body finds itself more 
susceptible to criticism of grid-lock and inefficiency, restoring the process of 
congressional oversight can provide an opportunity to restore trust in Congress.  
Rebalancing Congress’s status as an equal branch of the government also necessitates 
entertaining options that will preserve one of the branch’s oldest expressed duties.  
Recent struggles in holding executive officers accountable for conduct that is deemed 
questionable in the eyes of elected officials indicates that one necessary reform must 
focus on Congress’s power to punish those officers who are found guilty of 
contemptuous behavior.  Many commentators have noted that the main impediment 
to effective exercise of congressional oversight is the absence of adequate monetary 
resources rather than issues of separation of powers.121  The power to impose fines 
and monetary penalties on executive officers guilty of contemptuous behavior can 
serve the purpose of strengthening this old practice, as well as ensure fiscal 
accountability in conducting congressional investigations.  
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